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Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls ID 83404
Telephone (208)522-1230
Fax (208)522-1277
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellees
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

·NORMAN RILEY and ROBIN RILEY,
husband and wife,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
)
)
v.
)
)
SPIRAL BUTTE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, )
an Oregon Limited Liability Company;
)
JIM HORKLEY, an individual; and
)
JOHN DOES 1-V,
)
)
Defendants/Appellees.
)

Docket No.: 40061-2012
Case No. CV-08-145

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

COME NOW Appellant Rileys and hereby submit this Reply Brief in the above referenced
action.
1.

\VERE THERE ANY MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT RELATING TO THE
RILEYS' BREACH OF THE LEASE OPTION AGREEMENT

Horkley claims in his Brief, that there were no material issues of fact raised with the District
Court with regard to payments owed under the lease as well as all other lease requirements. Riley's
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agree that the Lease Option Agreement requires compliance with the terms of the Agreement at the
time the option to purchase was exercised. Rileys disagree that they had defaulted any portion of
the Agreement.
The first issue was the payment of the rent. As indicated in Rileys' Appellant Brief, after
Horkley and Rileys reached an Agreement for Rileys to tlli-m the property, Rileys and Horkley jointly
agreed that Howard and Mark Jensen would take over the farming of the property until the Rileys
were able to start farming. Horkley was aware that the Rileys were involved in a bankruptcy and did
not have the equipment to operate the farm. Because of this knowledge the parties were jointly
working toward a resolution to keep the Lease Option Agreement viable. The Rileys' financial
problems were known to Horkley before he loaned the Rileys money pursuant to the Lease Option
Agreement. R. Vol. I, p. 184. Horkley knew, or should have knovvn that Rileys were not currently
in a position to farm and complete the Lease Option Agreement without assistance. Knowing all this
information, Horkley and Riley jointly agree to have Jensens farm the property and pay the rental.
The District Court held, and Horkley claims in his brief that there was no evidence that the rental
obligation of $102,500 was to be paid by Jensens. This is not accurate. Norman Riley provided
testimony that he and Horkley agreed for Jensen to pay close to $105,000.

pa,)tm the

Q.

And what was the oral agreement on how much he was to
lease? Just a dollar figure he was to repay you for leasing it.

A

There wasn't a dollar figure to pay me. There was a dollar figure that
he was trying to round and make the $105,000. A11d the guideline to
make the $105,000 was, he was going to pay Jensen was going to
pay $200 an acre cash rent for the 450 acres. He was going to get the
additional water right on the south 150 primary water rights of - on
Katherine Rowan's property. That he was going to collect $100 an
acre for that water rights, which amounted to $15, 000.

R. Vol. I, p. 110.
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According to this testimony, thtrf;uU lease amount that was owed under the Lease Option
Agreement was to be covered by Jensens. This testimony regarding the payment of the full amount
from Jensens was ignored by the District Court when it concluded that the full amount of the lease
amount was not covered in the agreement when Jensens were going to be farming the property.
There remains a material issue of fact regarding the payment of the lease amount under the Lease
Option Agreement.
Horkley further states that the Rileys were in breach of the Lease Option Agreement for the
failure of the other terms of the Lease Option Agreement. Specifically the claimed breaches of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Maintenance of equipment;
Payment of taxes;
Payments on all equipment;
Water Assessments;
Payment of utilities;
Maintaining insurance; and
Use of the property.

Rileys do not dispute that the Lease Option Agreement required the Rileys to pay for or
provide those items. However, once the parties reached the agreement that Jensens would take over
the operation of the farm, there was the agreement that all matters would be taken over. Horkley
referenced in his brief the exchange that took place between Nonnan Riley and Horkley when the
two were discussing having a third party (Jensen) take over the farm operation. During that
exchange, Riley specifically asked that all the payments get made, to which Horkley agreed they
would. R. Vol. I, p. 125.

This was a reference to all the other items under the Lease Option

Agreement. Horkley advised Norman Riley that all payments would be made which in tum would
relieve Rileys of those ongoing obligations. After that, Horkley never contacted Rileys requesting
payment for any of the above referenced items, nor did Horkley provide information to Rileys about
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amounts that Horkley wanted the Rileys to pay. R. Vol. I, p. 124. Additionally, there was no
for the Rileys to obtain the information to provide for the above referenced issues. By agreement
with Horkley, Rileys were not in physical control of the property. Because Rileys were not in
physical control of the real property, they did not have the information to maintain and pay for the
above items. Additionally, they were not aware that the Jensens were not paying the amounts Riley
believed was supposed to be paid. R. Vol. I, p. 124. Rileys believed that the Jensens were paying
all amounts obligated under the Lease Option Agreement and Horkley never advised them otherwise.
R. Vol. I, p. 124.

2.

IF THERE WAS A SEPARATE ORAL LEASE, DID THE DISTRICT COURT
COR'RECTL Y THAT IT WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Horkley argues that the agreement with Jensens is immaterial to whether or not Rileys
breached the Lease Option Agreement with Horkley. However, it is this agreement between Horkley
and Rileys to have Jensens farm the property that confirms the terms of the Lease Option Agreement
were satisfied and further preserves

Riley's ability to exercise their option to purchase the

property. Both Rileys and Horkley agree that because of Rileys financial difficulties the Jensens
would take over the operation. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 184, 189. The District Court, in its decision
granting summary judgment to Horkley held that the oral lease agreement was a separate agreement
between Horkley and Jensen and therefore unenforceable in this matter because it did not satisfy the
statute of frauds. If this agreement between Horkley and Rileys was a separate oral agreement, Riley
contends that the oral agreement between Rileys and Horkley to substitute Jensens into the
agreement is enforceable. That agreement would have preserved Rileys' option to purchase the
property at the end of the lease term. Rileys' reference in the initial briefing to partial performance
of the oral agreement was to show that
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oral agreement behveen Rileys and Horkley had not only

been agreed to, but also partially performed. It is undisputed that Rileys and Horkley agreed to have
Jensen take over for Riley. R. Vol. I, pp. 169, 184, 189. It was also undisputed that there was
performance of this agreement. That agreement and paitial performance would have pulled their oral
agreement from the statute of frauds.
On the other hand, if the oral agreement between Horkley and Rileys is treated not as a
separate oral agreement but instead as a modification of the Lease Option Agreement, then it is still
enforceable and preserves the remaining terms of the Lease Option Agreement. The parties' course
of conduct implies the modification. Horkley met with Riley and both agreed to have Jensen farm
the property. After that oral modification, Horkley and the Rileys proceeded with the agreement.
The actions of the parties with this oral change created material issues of fact sufficient to survive
summary judgment.
3.

DIDTHEDISTRICTCOlJRTCORc~ECTLYCONCLUDETHATTHELEASETO

JENSENS WAS AN ORAL LEASE BETWEEN HORKLEY AND JENSENS
UNRELATED TO THE LEASE OPTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN SPIRA.L
BUTTE AND THE RILEYS

Horkley states that because he informed Rileys that he was leasing to Jensens, it was separate
and apart from the Lease Option Agreement. Horkley testified that he and Riley agreed that Jensens
would step in until Rileys were able to complete the lease. R. Vol. I, p. 184. Riley farther testified
that Horkley told him he wanted to lease to someone else and would make sure all payments were
made. R. Vol. I, pp. 169. This testimony is consistent with Rileys' claims that Horkley was working
with the Rileys to preserve the Lease Option Agreement by having the Jensens step in. It was not
an unrelated agreement just between Horkley and Jensens that Rileys are seeking to enforce. It is
the agreements between Horkley and the Rileys to have Jensens take over the operation until Rileys
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v.:ere able that should have been enforced. Sufficient issues of material fact have been raised to
survive sununary judgment and it was error for the District Court to

enforcement on an separate

agreement not between the parties at bar.

4.

WERE THE RlLEYS IN SUBSTANTIAL DEFAULT OF NUMEROUS
PROVISIONS OF THE LEASE OPTION AGREEMENT Ac~D DID
RlLEYS
FAIL TO TENDERPATh1ENT ON OR BEFORE THE CLOSING DATE.

The issue of whether the Rileys were in substantial default of the other provisions was
addressed while discussing the first issue. As an additional argument, Horkley claims that the Rileys
failed to cure the default after being advised of the default in a December 21, 2007 letter. In
reviewing that letter, the main focus was a claim of default because the water rights associated with
the property had been sold. R. Vol. I, pp. 141, 142. However, the issue involving

water rights

existed prior to the parties entering into the Lease Option Agreement. Horkley was aware of
problems with the water at the time the parties entered into the Lease Option Agreement. R. Vol.
I, pp. 108. Horkley should not be allowed to treat the issue with the water rights as a
the issue existed prior to the Lease Agreement and Horkley was aware of the issue.

when
only

reference in the December 21, 2007 letter was a general reference to the Rileys' never having taken
possession of the property. R. Vol. I, pp. 169. However, as has already been covered previously,
both Ri.leys and Horkley agreed that Jensen would take possession and farm until Rileys were able
to. Horkley should not be allowed to use that claim as a default of the lease.
With respect to the claim that Rileys never tendered the purchase price to Horkley, the Rileys
had available to them the money from a third party, Rhett Summers. Mr. Summers testified that he
was willing to wire money to the Rileys for them to purchase the property. However, the Rileys later
informed him that on the day they were supposed to exercise their option Horkley did not show. R.
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I, pp. 197-203. Mr. Suw,mers references a "coun date" when he was going to provide the
, but he was confusing a closing with the term "court date". R. Vol. I,
5.

ATTORi'JEY

206.

ON APPEAL

Horkley has requested attorney fees on appeal. Rileys contend that they have a meritorious
claim and have shown sufficient material issues of fact to surviving summary judgment and
warranting a reversal

the District Court's decision. Rileys met with Horkley and agreed that a

party would take over the Lease Option Agreement until Rileys were able to. Horkley and
Rileys pursued this course until it came time for Rileys to exercise their option to purchase the
property from Horkley. Only then did Horkley advise that he believed the Rileys were in default and
failed to allow Rilcys to exercise their option to purchase. Rileys' appeal was not merely a request
to revisit and second guess the Districy Court. It has been shovm through the evidence provided that
material issues of fact are present warranting a reversal

the District Court and thus a denial of

attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this

day ofFebrnary, 2013
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
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OF SERVICE
I herebv certifv that I am a dulv licensed attomev in the
..,,

"'

.,I

.,;

my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the

ofidaho, resident of and

day of February, 2013, I caused a true and correct
,.,,~·~"--'"'

copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S

to be served upon the following persons

at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with
the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
RONALD L SWAFFORD ESQ
SWAFFORD LAW OFFICE
525 NINTH STREET
IDAHO FALLS ID 83404

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

THOMSEN STEPHENS LA \V OFFICES,

By:

MJW:tlh
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PLLC

